In half a century, record time by historical standards, the United States militarily dominated the world. In the decades which followed the birth of the new world order, America sought to secure this domination, using the same trick which had panned out for them during World War 2: converting their unrivaled economic power into military might. But the strategy seems to have backfired, due to lack of strategic insight, and the United States Army is now realizing that several armies dispose of better equipment than they do.
The United States came to par on fighter planes during world war two, when it managed to fight Messerschmitts and Zeros on a rather level field. Just after the war, prop fighters were quickly replaced with jets, and thus started the generations. Nowadays, poor countries have no air force, developing countries have third-generation fighters (such as Saab 37 Viggens, Migs 21 to 25 and Sukhois 15 to 17). 4th generation jets replaced them in the 1980s, with new characteristics ranging from long-range engagement (destroying an enemy beyond visual range with missiles), super-cruise (maintaining supersonic flight without afterburners), low-radar signature and computerized avionics. These jets, namely F-14 to 18, Typhoon, Rafale, equip the air forces of all developed countries, save one. The United States used their formidable military funding to leap into the 5th generation, where they stand alone, with the F-22 and the F-35. The gist was to cram all jets into one, able to perform all missions, from ground attack to air interception, and from reconnaissance to electronic warfare. After a bottomless pit of investment (unit cost soared during development and reached over twice its initial price of 75 million dollars per aircraft, totaling a 400-billion-dollar operation) and many years of production lag, the F-35, during a mock-fight against a 4th generation F-16 (30 years older), was unable to intercept the decoy, for lack of turning radius. Which is more: many retrofitted or upgraded 4th generation planes have similar performance, and have cost their owning countries a fraction of the bill. Now, one may say that money is no issue to the bottomless American wallet, but it is known to many that equipment too expensive to be maintained tends… not to be maintained. General Patton, for example, was lucky enough to have been born in wealth, which enabled him to buy the spare parts for his tanks, on his own funds. An eventually inevitable slump in the economy will paralyze any high-maintenance air force.
Americans made the same mistake regarding land vehicles: too much, too expensive, too rigid and without much point. The same US Army was able to defeat hardened enemies using nothing but equivalent equipment, tactics and fortitude in France, Germany, the Pacific, Vietnam, Korea – Iraq being left aside, as the army was ill-prepared, ill-equipped and already disbanding when the Americans invaded. The Future Combat Systems programs intended to replace every vehicle in the army with a newer generation, introducing unmanned vehicles in the battlefield for the first time. A closer look at the artillery section of this program is interesting. The current Paladin self-propelled howitzers (M109s, in all its different variants) is at par with all other equivalent cannons in the developed world, in the sense that it holds the same crucial characteristics. Among those: low deployment time, ability to switch types of shells rapidly, and the so-called “Mercy system” (MRSI – Multiple rounds, simultaneous impact) as well, of course, as standardized ammunition. But having rigged the vehicle with all sort of additional high-tech equipment made it unreliable, to the extent that several NATO partners which had purchased the Paladin quickly phased them out for alternative, more battle-proven and reliable alternatives. It isn’t so much that the Paladin isn’t properly designed (though it has its technical issues), it’s that it was designed to fight something which is nowhere to be found (a large conventional enemy) and not the current enemy. High-tech, but fragile and inflexible, and therefore ill-adapted to the needs of the army.
The Nexter Caesar artillery system makes a good comparison point. The truck-mounted 155-mm cannon was deployed in Afghanistan, where artillery fire must cover immense areas (in a rather conventional way), and in Mali where innovating use was made of it, in a way that intrigued generals around the world. The Caesar was used where it was expected the least, in combat facing armed insurgents in small mobile teams. It performed highly in offensive actions, thanks to its extreme deployment speed (high on-road and off-road velocity, and below three minutes to deploy the cannon) and provided high protection, both with armored cabins and with its scrambling speed which protects it from counter-battery fire. The now-combat-proven Caesar therefore proved a dogged threat to infantry-type insurgent formations, while being protected from them. At the same time, it remained immune to artillery fire, which insurgents did possess but were unable to use effectively, for lack of pinpointing French howitzers.
While proper and adequate funding is essential, pouring money onto the battlefield isn’t the solution to everything. Extravagantly sophisticated weapons systems have proven, prove and will prove unreliable on the battlefield, and they run a fair chance is missing the war. The United States is shipshape to fight the cold war which ended 20 years ago, but unable to prevail in Iraq and Afghanistan. Only rugged and flexible material will pass the test of fire to become battle-proven enough to bring countries to commit to it long-lastingly. While 5th generation fighter sales are either lagging or blocked by Congress, 4th generation sales are healthy and picking up. And while countries are, one by one, decommissioning the Paladins, the Caesar sales are on the rise, with Thailand, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia already in the club, and Vietnam soon to join in. In the last case, Dô Ba Ty, Vietnamese Army Chief of Staff, recently express strong interest for Caesar systems, in the context of rising tensions with neighboring countries and especially China. Something to watch out for, over the next while.
Is there such thing as cyberwar?
Two decades have passed after Arquilla and Ronfeldt in 1993 warned the public about an upcoming. They were also the first to introduce a concept of cyberwar and give an elaborated opinion. They referred to a conduct and preparation of military operations using information-related principles and also invoked a link between intelligence (the collection of information for political or military purpose) and cyber operations. Now, the scale of intelligence has significantly expanded.
Interestingly, before cyber appeared, there was a radio which was used for intelligence purposes and was weaponized later in the World War II. From that time on, electronic warfare became standard characteristics of a modern conflict. Despite this, there is a key difference between electronic warfare and a cyber one. Traditional electronic warfare aimed to guide, target, or protect weapons systems (Ibid., p. 24). In contrast, cyber makes today’s weapons and military systems smarter but also more vulnerable for an attack.
At the moment everyone still wonders what the whole idea of cyberwar means. There is no accepted interpretation or definition. Furthermore, many experts even say that such war does not even exist (or cannot be referred to the notion of “war”). Perhaps, it is due to the fact that a war in cyberspace has not yet happened. To make it clear, cyber capability has not actually killed anyone and a code has not been used as the use of force.
Similarly, the dangers of a nuclear bomb were recognized only after its use, the same goes to the notion of “nuclear war”. Although there have been many cyberattacks, none of them have been raised to the level of war because none of them, in fact, caused the level of damage which could be adhered to the level of a large-scale conflict.
Cyber warfare has derived from different aspects of conventional warfare and traditional definitions of war. It usually involves organized units within nation-state in offensive or defensive operations which are part of a war or a conflict.
In general, since cyber study is relatively new, there are many competing terms and definitions to explain cyber phenomenon. The following concepts – the revolution in military affairs, electronic warfare, information warfare, and cyber war – have been all offered to describe the new emerging area of conflict. Experts do not agree on any particular term, more often using different notions when talking about cyber issues. Nonetheless, it is vital to understand the facts of the 21st century similarly to the need that rose along with the invention of atomic reaction. A major concern now is no longer weapons of mass destruction, but weapons of mass disruption. (2009, p. 47).
One of the central elements to define a cyberwar, is that it has to meet the same criteria, applied to any other type of war. Vandalism or spying is an act of crime, but they do not start wars. So, assumingly, there has to be physical destruction and casualties in order to declare a war.
Therefore, a cyberwar should have real world damage similar to a conventional war. For this matter, it should probably take place in a digital world. What is not clear, however, is whether it should be fought exclusively in cyberspace or it can accompany a conventional attack too. This aspect is quite interesting, because cyberattacks can easily be used in combination with a kinetic attack and can multiply the force and power of the attacker.
In this case, it does not make sense to create a new term “cyberwar” as it falls down under the same definition of war. It is the same example when aerial bombings supported the attacks on the ground during the World War I, but in the end we called it a war, not a particular type of war. Consequently, cyber introduction resembles more a revolution in military affairs, rather that a new emerging type of warfare.
What is clear, though, is that the difference in definitions complicates the matters of regulating cyberspace and prevents achieving a common ground on cyber issues and/or developing new treaties and agreements between the states. So far there is no international agreement on the cyber principles, despite some attempts of the states to engage into negotiations (Budapest Conference on Cyberspace, the World Conference on International Telecommunications). There is, however, the Convention on Cybercrime, the first international agreement that addresses compute crime, adopted by the Council of Europe. Interestingly enough, Russia (as a part of the Council) neither signed nor ratified the agreement, whereas US (not part of the Council) recognized it and ratified it.
Apart from these difficulties in defining cyberwar, there has been a hyperbolic use of the word itself, mostly by media and tabloids (e.g. The Washington Post, “We are at cyberwar and we are our own enemy”; The New York Times, “How to prevent Cyberwar”; Zdnet, “Cyberwar: a guide to the frightening future of online conflict”; Komsomolskaya Pravda, “Are we expecting the First World Cyberwar?” etc.). They do not usually give any concrete information but are eager to use this term and apply it randomly to different cases just because it sounds good. All in all, uninformed public use of the word has enormously contributed into the heat surrounding cyber implications.
Futher, cyberattacks are too often discussed equivalently, regardless of its impact. In this sense, minor cases like ransomware or phishing might be raised to the level of an armed attack (especially if they affect multiple computers worldwide). Yet, these cases are good examples of cybercrime, and crime is not a war. When individuals engage into this type of activity, they do not engage in a war. The same goes for espionage in cyberspace. Catching a spy on one’s territory will certainly put pressure on bilateral relations, but it would not start a war.
This exaggeration of cyberattacks can be explained through securitization theory. The notion offered by the Copenhagen Security School describes how a certain concept can be politicized and securitized to the extent that it becomes a threat to national security (See Buzan, 2006).
To conclude, it should be mentioned that there is no guidance for the conduct of “cyberwar”. There are no internationally agreed definitions and, to that extent, the whole idea of cyberwar so far seems unrealistic. At this moment technology is not sophisticated enough to ensure a military conduct entirely in cyberspace. Besides, any cyberattack of such scale would presumably result in a physical destruction, which consequently might provoke a conventional retaliation attack. This, in result, would cause a war we know for years, so there is no need to introduce a particular type of war. On another note, using cyber operations to support a conventional war and/or conflict is the way to go, but in this case it is just a revolution and modernization in military affairs.
I would be interested to hear your opinion about that in the comments below.
For further information see:
1) A movie “War Games” (1983)
2) Arquilla, J. and Ronfeldt, D. (1993). The Cyberwar is Coming! RAND Corporation, [online] Available at: https://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP223.html
3) Cetron, M. J. and Davies, O. (2009). Ten critical trends for cyber security. The Futurist, 43(5), pp. 40–49.
4) Stiennon, R. (2015). There Will Be Cyberwar: How The Move To Network-Centric War Fighting Has Set The Stage For Cyberwar. Michigan: IT-Harvest Press.
On the issue of cyber security of critical infrastructures
There is a lot of talk in regards to cyberattacks nowadays. A regular user worries about its data and tries to secure by all means necessary. Yet, no one really thinks whether the power plants or nuclear facilities are well secured. Everyone assumes that they should be secured.
The reality, however, differs. According to many reports of cyber security companies, there is an increased risk of cyberattacks, targeting SCADA and ICS. Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) is used for the systems that control physical equipment – power plants, oil and gas pipelines, they can also control or monitor processes such as heating or energy consumption. Along with Industrial Control Systems (ICS) they control critical elements of industrial automation processes. Exploiting vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures can lead to the consequences of unimaginable scale. (These types of attacks are actually used in a cyberwar scenarios and hypothetical military settings).
There are many reasons why these systems are vulnerable for attacks. First of all, the main problem is that these systems have an old design; they were built before they were connected to any networks. They were later configured to connect via Ethernet, and that’s when they became a part of a larger infrastructure. The more advanced SCADA system is becoming, the more vulnerabilities are these to exploit. The updates should be regular and on time. Secondly, there is a lack of monitoring. New devices that are connected allow remote monitoring, but not all devices have the same reporting capabilities. There are also authentication issues (weak passwords, authentication process), however, this is supposed to restrict unauthorized access (See Common SCADA Threats and Vulnerabilities at Patriot Technologies, Inc. Online).
In these scenarios, there is no certainty to know what is going to backfire because of the complexity of communications and power networks. This is also called a cascading effect of attacks. Not knowing who is connected to who may cause major disruptions. The example of the US East Coast power blackout in 2003 proves this point (a failure in one element of the grid spreads across other electrical networks). However, given this, it is also complicated for an attacker to predict consequences, if an attack executed. This kind of attack can easily escalate into more serious conflict, so it might not be the best option for states to employ such methods.
Moreover, there is a risk to damage a critical infrastructure unintentionally. That is if a virus or worm did not intend to target SCADA but happen to spread there as well. The uncontrollability of the code may seriously impair the desire to use it, especially when it comes to nation-states. For instance, in 2003 a worm penetrated a private network of the US Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station and disabled a safety monitoring system for 5 hours. In 2009, French fighter jets could not take off because they were infected with a virus.
Indeed, a scenario where an attacker gains access to a SCADA system and manipulates with the system, causing disruptions on a large-scale, might be hypothetical but it does not make it less possible in the future. However, the only known case so far, which affected an industrial control centre, is Stuxnet. It did not result in many deaths, yet it drew attention of the experts on the plausibility of future more sophisticated attacks. These potential upcoming attacks might cause the level of destruction, comparable to that of a conventional attack, therefore resulting in war.
Bradbury, D. (2012). SCADA: a Critical Vulnerability. Computer Fraud & Security, 4, p. 11-14.
Briefly about the Russian Political Discourse
As you may have noticed, the recent international discourse has been rotating around Russia and its relations to other countries for a long time. Needless to say that after the events in Georgia/Ukraine, this discourse is far from friendly. Some even say that rhetoric of the Cold War has returned. What makes people abroad wonder is why Russia chooses to respond to its foreign partners in this particular way? Why is it the way it is?
To begin with, there are several reasons that shape Russian rhetoric. First of all, they are historical and cultural values. Russia sees itself as a defender of its rights and identity and someone who is not going to follow someone else’s rules. Back to the 13th century, the grand prince (rus. knyaz) Aleksander Nevsky only accepted submission to the Golden Horde to protect the Russian culture and belief, therefore depriving the West of the opportunity to take over its territories. This mentality still governs the minds of people. Today, current political rhetoric is doing the same by refusing the Western pressure and external interference into its business.
After the Golden Horde, Russia has managed to maintain its unity. Back then, the East saw the country to be an heir to the great Byzantine Empire. Meanwhile, the enormous size of the country was rather intimidating; and even more, when it started acquiring new territories (remember reaction to the situation with Crimea).
On the one hand, Moscow tries to present itself strong when it communicates with the Europe; on the other hand, the Western neighbours seem to use the same old-fashioned strategy to isolate the big neighbour. Since the time of Ivan the Terrible, no one really has wanted strong and stable Russia and there were steps before to prevent the unity of Eurasia.
The long history of Russia plays a big role in forming the modern mind of the citizen and current political rhetoric. Russian people and the government would not admit defeat and would do anything possible to prevail, even if it means to live in humble circumstances for some time (think of the continuous sanctions).
The tough policy of Peter the Great, the emperor of Russia, has brought the country to a new level in comparison to others. At that time already, all the international questions were only resolved with the help of Russia. In the following years, the power of the country kept growing only to solidify during the rule of Catherine the Great. The famous grand chancellor of Russia and the chief of foreign policy Bezborodko used to say, “I don’t know how it will be at your time, but at this time not a single gun is allowed to fire without our permission”. Now, Russia tries to achieve similar influence.
The period after the World War II proved to be fruitful for the development of the European countries. While the US and USSR were competing, Europe was free from deciding on serious issues, so it could absorb and enjoy the time of quiet development.
Nonetheless, there has been a clear confrontation between the two ideologies, Nazism and Communism. Even though the USSR did not try to exterminate the nations, the scary ghost of the USSR keeps frightening the rest of the world. The impression of “evil USSR” flying over the international relations is still there and penetrates the minds of the people.
After the collapse of the USSR, there was a chance to promote peace and peaceful coexistence. Russia has repeatedly expressed its interest in it, yet the Western partners have chosen another way: NATO enlargement to the East (which is believed to be a broken promise). Interestingly enough, George Kennan, the so-called creator of containment policy of Soviet expansion, considered the NATO expansion a tragic mistake.
All in all, abovementioned factors play a significant role in shaping the Russian political discourse. Cultural and historical values, national pride (and therefore negative feeling towards the Western sanctions) as well as the use of state symbols to unite the country are the most important rhetoric tools in the Russian language arsenal. Its constant and regular transmission through the media and other communication channels make this rhetoric influential and persuasive.
 [URL: http://www.istmira.com/istoriya-rossii-s-drevnejshix-vremen-do-nashix/290-kakovy-itogi-i-posledstviya-vneshnej-politiki.html] [дата обращения: 20.05.2016]
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