The major rival brothers in the world, who have been fighting against each other since their birth, used to fight with foreign weapons earlier, but now they want to fight in a new style, that is with their indigenous weapons.
Pakistan, as a member of US led military pact CENTO and SEATO, started receiving high tech weapons of that time with money to keep an eye on India and launch an assault when needed. Seeing this, India began to import weapons from Soviet Union and started upgrading its force. Both the countries started filling up their inventory at the same time and today both are facing the problems of their ageing fighters aircrafts.
India is in urgent need of replacing its ageing MiG 21 whereas Pakistan is in need of replacing its ageing Nanchang A-5 bombers, Chengdu F-7 interceptors and Mirage III/5 fighters.
India decided to start a project of making an indigenous fighter aircraft that can serve in all purposes of the air force, whereas Pakistan joined later an already going on Chinese project of development of a fighter aircraft.
Both India and Pakistan claim their aircraft as indigenous, but as on April 13, 2011 none of the aircraft is 100% indigenous as India is using american GE engine to power the fighter and Pakistan is using almost all the technology from China and engine from Russia in their version of the fighter.
It is believed that when India will complete its Kaveri engine project which was supposed to power LCA earlier, then LCA can be proudly claimed by Indians as an indigenous aircraft. India couldn’t use indigenous engine in the prototype of LCA due to a delay caused by technical difficulties in the development of the engine.
If India completes the engine, it will become the fifth country after US, UK, Russia and France who can make their own engine.
Today both LCA and JF-17 are reality and not on papers anymore. Tejas was inducted on 11 Jan, 2011 whereas JF-17 was inducted last year in Pakistani air force.
Both Indians and Pakistani have already started loving their new weapon, but in this new love they commit a mistake of comparing these two planes with each other. JF-17 will be Pakistan’s main fighter accompanied by their upgraded F-16s, whereas LCA Tejas will be India’s additional aircraft for medium role combat missions after Indo-Russian 5th generation fighter aircraft PAK-FA, Under-development indigenous 5th Gen AMCA (Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft), Indo Russian 4.5 Gen Su-30MKI and to-be-inducted 126 4.5 Gen MRCA Dassualt Rafael (Multi Role Combat Aircraft).
While Pakistan and China claim there aircraft as indigenous and result of 50-50 partnership between China and Pakistan, there are lot of foreign companies and organizations involved in making it a success.
After the U.S and European companies cancelled their participation in the development of the westernized Chengdu J-7 variant known as Super 7 which is openly based on MiG 21 design, China launched a program to develop an indigenous evolution of this Mig 21 based design. which was named as FC -1 (Fighter China 1)
To expedite its development, in 1998, China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation (CATIC) purchased the abandoned Mikoyan MAPO Izd 33 design, research and test information and data along with other research and technical assistance which was developed under Project 33. This doesn’t mean that the design was now based on Mig 33 or that FC – 1 is the continuation of Soviet Project 33. The Project 33 started in 1980 and was stopped in 1986 taking the note of changing Soviet Union’s Air Force’s demands. Though later the improved version of the same design was introduced at the 1994 Farnborough Air Show as the briefly used marketing name for the MiG-29ME export model of the MiG-29M.
Although engineers from the Mikoyan Aero-Science Production Group (MASPG) have provided technical, research and design assistance on the FC-1 project, its aerodynamic design is quite different from that of Project 33. The wings are attached at mid-fuselage on the FC-1, whereas the Izd 33 is a low-wing design. The FC-1’s platform resembles that of the F-16, while that of the Izd 33 is similar to the MiG-29. The FC-1’s inlets are ‘D’-shaped and angled, but those for the Izd 33 are rectangular and slab-sided. Given the FC-1’s heritage of the ‘Super 7’, J-7, and MiG-21, some analysts believe that the FC-1’s internal structure is more likely based on the MiG-21 than on the Izd 33, which some have called a “single-engine MiG-29”.
Looking at the pictures one may say that the JF-17 Plane uses Soviet era’s MiG 21 airframe which is highly debatable. Although avionics and other basic things are superior in JF-17 than MiG 21.
In October 1995 Pakistan was asked to select a Western company before the end of the year which would provide and integrate the avionics in FC-1 for them (Source: http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/1995/10/18/21419/pakistan-nears-fc-1-avionics-decision.html).
Avionics suites were being proposed by FIAR and Thomson-CSF, based on the Grifo S7 and RC400 radars respectively (source: http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/1999/07/14/53912/china-and-pakistan-agree-on-super-7-fighter-development.html).
Russia’s Klimov offered a variant of the RD-33 turbofan engine to power the fighter. Russia earlier had denied China from transferring the engine to Pakistan as it was against Russian policy and India’s interest, but later, for some reason, Russia had no issue in China supplying those engines to Pakistan. To international media they replied in diplomatic parlance, Chinese were in such a hurry that they had not heard the last word from Russia on this subject. It is believed that Pakistan is unsatisfied with the engine and a new deal for a different engine, most probably to have Snecma M53-P2 could be finalized.
Rather than using the Ada programming language, which is developed dedicated for military applications, the software for the aircraft is written using the popular civilian C++ programming language which students use to develop programs in high schools, this might give an edge to Pakistan where software industry is not very skilled and C++ resources can be easily trained in large numbers (source: http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/stuck-in-sichuan-pakistani-jf17-program-grounded-02984/).
In India’s LCA case: Airframe, Radar, Avionics, Cockpit, landing Gear, Ejection System, Flight Simulator, Software, Propulsion (when Kaveri will come) all are home made.
The pictures below are posted so people can compare JF 17 design with MiG 21 and MiG 29.
Comparison According to 2008 Aviation Source Book, Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 28, 2008 and DRDO TechFocus February 2011″. DRDO. February 2011. Retrieved 9 April 2011.
Now among these two aircrafts it is very difficult to comment which one is better, as these aircrafts don’t belong to the same category. In terms of development, India’s LCA offers something new to the world, new design, new weapons, new systems and, in future, a new engine. While LCA was never made to be India’s Sukhoi but it does gives the platform to India for further modification and development of new projects Whereas Pakistan’s JF-17 is a modification of many previous technologies.
LCA program was started in 1983, whereas JF-17 program was started in 1989 as Chengdu F-7, which was later changed to Fighter China project in 1991. In 1995 Pakistan reportedly joined the project.
Though China has kept development and production of JF-17 on for delivering them to Pakistan and my be to other countries, it prefers J-10 fighters over JF-17 for its own airforce.
Both LCA and JF-17 are 4th generation fighter aircraft, but advanced composite frames and high tech electronics/avionics made international expert call LCA-Tejas a 4.5 Gen aircraft during Aero India 2010, in Bangalore.
While JF-17s are very much needed to serve depleting Pakistani Air Force as a main fighter along with F-16s, LCA is mainly a research project India has carried through these years. LCA was never made to compare with Sukhois, but it has faired very well on international level and now India has a platform and can develop more aircrafts on this platform as the plan of AMCA (Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft, an indigenous 5th gen stealth fighter) has already been cleared by the government.
While India has achieved self reliance in Air Fighter technology, Pakistan has achieved an experience of working in joint venture. It is the first major project of Pakistan with an international joint venture. India has previously worked with Russia in a partnership on development of world’s only supersonic cruise missile, Brahmos. Presently, India and Russia are also working on the development of 5th generation fighter aircraft PAK-FA, in a move to regain the air dominance which was taken over by the americans with their 5th gen F-22 which outsmarted Sukhoi 30 MKI, also a product of Indo-Russian partnership. India and France are also working on Surface to Air Missile “Maitri” project.
A Little bit of Fun and Sarcasm
“JF-17 Not as advanced as LCA: Nawaz Sharif, Former Prime Minister of Pakistan”(jpeg)
“I have heard it is very advanced plane, but it is not ready yet.” said Nawaz Sharif to retired Air Commodre Pervez Khokhar. Praising the JF-17 without mentioning Chinese cooperation, he further added in light mood, “I am saying you buy this plane from us, though it is not as advanced as your LCA, but it also has a glass cockpit like yours and can drop bombs for you,” he said in sarcastic mood.
Related Comparison Articles on The World Reporter
Attribution and the problem of retaliation in cyberspace
If a country is hit with a computer program and there is destruction/death involved, there is usually retaliation, a counter attack and an appropriate response. An opposing side is given a chance to respond to the enemy by means it deems necessary, especially if there is a lot of damage involved. In terms of conventional weapons it is clear who attached the target, yet cyberspace is another niche with its challenges.
Attribution in cyberspace has been a question for a long time. Although terrorist attacks attribution is somewhat difficult, cyberspace introduces a more complicated process. Anonymity is a challenge as perpetrators may easily hide their identities. Moreover, an attack can be launched from a number of computers, operated by different people and placed in different places across the world. According to Clarck and Landau, challenge lies in several dimensions: 1) identify a computer from which the attack was launched; 2) identify a person, who had been operating the computer at the time of the attack; 3) identify a main actor, who gave an order and/or an actor behind the attack (2010).
According to the technology consultant at the security company Sophos, perpetrators in cyber may use compromised computers that belong to unsuspecting innocent people to break in someone’s computer. A hack may be coming from China, but it may be under control of someone who is situated in another country. This was the case with the DDoS cyberattacks that happened in Estonia 2007 (it involved more than 80, 000 hijacked computers from around 178 countries). Moreover, even if an attacker is supposedly found, it is easy to blame it on a third party, saying that a computer has been hacked. This, consequently, gives rise to a plausible deniability.
Although technology is being developed in order to analyze and solve the problem of attribution, it is still a challenge because of the basic design of the Internet. In theory, nonetheless, it is possible to solve the problem. According to Feaver, in the future the language of computer networks will be replaced by the Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6), which will raise the amount of computer addresses from four billion to an infinite number. That means that everything and everyone could be associated with a unique number. IPv6 may additionally support Internet Protocol Security for authentication of the Internet traffic (Ibid.).
However, at this point of time technological analysis should always be accompanied by intelligence and information analysis. This helps to identify attackers, understand more about capabilities and intentions, and whether the attack was sanctioned by the government. Strategic and political considerations will be essential too.
A damaging cyberattack may easily lead to escalation of the situation, which is another implication for a balance in international relations. In case of Stuxnet, a malware that affected a nuclear facility in Iran, if it achieved its believed goal to disrupt a nuclear infrastructure, it could have brought a high-level of destruction with many people dead. In this case, Iran would have probably retaliated with kinetic means, rather when relying on unreliable cyberattacks (unless they had the technology). However, as attribution was still lacking, it is not clear whether they would opt for this option.
Thus, attribution poses certain problems when it comes to the question of retaliation. When it is not clear who attacked, it is hard to prosecute or retaliate in response. Attribution also created additional challenges in decision-making, considering the speed of a cyberattack. Even if attribution is positive, it is still hard to understand what procedures are to be followed. If there are no casualties and no physical destruction, it is easier to opt for sanctions rather than a military retaliation. Moreover, if attribution is later established to be incorrect, there may be serious consequences.
On another note, the use of cyberattacks may have further complications, if the countries involved are nuclear. In case of major destructive consequences after a cyberattack, a country would be left with a choice whether to retaliate in kind or to employ conventional weapons, especially if they do not have a cyber capability.
What happens when an attacker is not identified but consequences are drastic? More importantly, if it is “believed” to be identified (yet without certainty), will a country retaliate? These questions are still yet to be answered, as there has been no precedent on such a scale. What is clear, cyberattacks present additional challenges in global security that should be undoubtedly addressed.
 Cluley, G. (2011). China denies hacking high-tech weapon maker. Naked security by Sophos, [online] Available at: https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2011/09/20/china-denies-hacking-high-tech-weapon-make/ [Accessed on 3.02.2018].
A new cyber arms race
Not long time ago cyber threats were not even on agenda in security, let along national security landscape. Now, the situation is different. Now, everyone recognizes the risks of hyper-connected world: from an individual in front of the computer to a high-level officer, operating a nuclear facility. As new tools are being developed, cyber-security occupies an important niche in decision-making and planning. As more and more people are securing their laptops, tablets, phones; the military started doing that too.
Just six years ago the US Defence Secretary warned about a possible Cyber Pearl Harbour. Cyber Pearl Harbour is a strategic surprise attack which could potentially incapacitate computational and communication capabilities, leading to a devastating impact on the country (Goldman and Arquilla, 2014, p. 13). This notion is usually fuelled by ongoing media reports that countries are in active pursuit of offensive cyber capabilities which could jeopardize any sector, penetrate any system and cause major disruptions. Regardless of the accuracy of these reports, every country understands that these cyber insecurities can be and, probably, will be exploited by an enemy. That is why many states are now allocating enormous amount of resources to develop defensive cyber means along with the offensive capabilities.
The number of cyberattacks is increasing. One can argue about its future potential targets, but it is clear that we should assume that cyberattacks will become only more sophisticated and, possibly, more deadly in the future. That is why vulnerabilities should be addressed, and the nations should be prepared to the cyber challenge.
Along the most well-known cyberattacks happened in Estonia (2007), Syria (impacted air defence systems 2007), Georgia (2008), Iran (Stuxnet 2009-10), The Saudi Arabia (Aramco 2012), Ukraine (2014), U.S. (electoral campaign 2016). Additionally, the world was quite agitated about WannaCry and Petya attacks in 2017. All in all, most of the recent attacks targeted commercial sectors, showing that there might be a constraining norm in regards to military sector and critical infrastructures.
This consequently might indicate that states might be pursuing more sophisticated technologies in order to target more sophisticated systems. It might as well suggest a possibility of on-going cyber arms races between the countries. However, there are clear limitations of cyber warfare, as no physical damage occurred and no people were killed. Even the damage inflicted on critical infrastructures was limited and failed to cause major consequences. However, financial losses as a result of cyberattacks can be rather substantial and might have a great impact on economically weaker states.
Based on the scale of current attacks, we can only assume that the technology will spread and get more sophisticated with the time. As Mazanec has outlined, cyber warfare capabilities will play a role in future military conflicts, as they are being integrated into military and state doctrines (2015, pp. 80-83). However, despite cyber challenges to national security, it does not necessarily reflect that deterrence methods and tactics will be applicable to cyberspace.
This technology is quite cheap, requires less resources and personnel, and therefore allows less economically advanced countries developing cyber. As a result, there is a clear asymmetry with weaker states competing with the world powers. Consequently, the threat is multiplied internationally. So the states are now in an unprecedented situation, because of the high level of uncertainty that cyberspace poses. This compels the states to adapt to the fast changing environment in international relations.
According to the report of McAfee, a global security technology company, 57% believe that cyber arms race is taking place now. The top officials in the West are convinced too. For example, NATO secretary general Stoltenberg said that cyber would become integral to any military conflict. Following this, NATO Defence Ministers have agreed that cyber will be a part of military planning and operations. It is clear that the West is fully aware of cyber developments and eager to use it in its actions.
Similarly, the Chinese Military Strategy of 2015 has also admitted that cyberspace will take a place in strategic competition among all parties. The Indian Army is also not falling behind and strengthening its cyber arsenal. General Rawat has recently said that India is now more concerned about developing these cyber capabilities than fighting on the border. The chain-reaction follows as in the case of the Cold War in pursuing the technologies and keeping up-to-date with the others states.
In this situation a leader faces similar challenges as in proliferation of any other military technology. There are four possible scenarios that make it difficult to calculate probabilities (According to Goldman and Arquilla, 2014):
1) We develop a cyber capability – They develop a cyber capability;
This is a frequent scenario and occurs when both countries have technological capability to develop cyber means.
2) We develop a cyber capability – They don’t develop a cyber capability;
There are certain problems in verifying if a country really lacks a capability to pursue cyber weapons. However, this case gives obvious advantage and leverage to a state that develops cyber capability.
3) We don’t develop a cyber capability – They develop a cyber capability;
From a political and strategic point of view, it puts a state into a disadvantageous position, therefore, making it undesired.
4) We don’t develop a cyber capability – They don’t develop a cyber capability;
It is more desirable; however, no direct experience exists. Usually if there is a possibility that a technology can be developed, it will be developed at least by some state.
Interestingly enough, there is not much concrete information available in regards to these developments, whether it is amount of arsenal, types of cyber capability, or just simple information on the notions. Information which is accessible is usually written by the Western authors (it is particularly covered by US officials/military and academia) or can be found in government’s documents. NATO common strategy, perhaps, contributes towards it. On a broader scale, cyber is treated as a state secret and specific information is classified. There is much information which is not available (for example, development of cyber weapons, its employment, reasons for its employment, legality of the use of cyber weapons etc.). In some countries, there is nothing to find at all.
The good example is cyber capabilities of Russia. There is no available information: no official statements, no official policy, no academic articles published, it goes to the extent that even media is not engaged in these issues. Alexei Arbatov (2018), an internationally recognized scholar on global security, has recently confirmed that even academic debate in Russia does not officially exist, only at the university level or informal. Notwithstanding, the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation recognizes the fact that military threats and dangers are now shifting towards cyberspace (“informatsionnoe prostranstvo”).
Similarly to Russia, China also maintains secrecy concerning its developments in the military. According to the report of the Institute for Security Technology Studies (2004), available sources insist that Beijing is pursuing cyber warfare programs, but classified nature of specifics aggravates assessments.
This secrecy around cyber resembles the secrecy surrounding nuclear developments. All of this information was classified too, yet the principles of nuclear governance have managed to emerge even in the tight environment of the Cold War. Similar situation arose in regards to the use of drones. All the initial strikes of drones were classified, and only with time the debate started to evolve. At the moment it is quite vigorous.
As for cyber, it will certainly take time to talk freely about cyber capabilities and warfare. It will be different in different countries, but in the end the debate will open up as well as new technologies will come and cyber would have become a history.
Arbatov, A. (2018). Stability in a state of flux. Opinion presented at the 31st ISODARCO Winter Course – The Evolving Nuclear Order: New Technology and Nuclear Risk, 7-14 January 2018, Andalo.
Billo, Ch. and Chang, W. (2004). Cyber Warfare, an Analysis of the Means and Motivations of selected Nation States. Institute for Security Technology Studies, [online] Available at http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/docs/cyberwarfare.pdf [Accessed on 27.12.2017].
Goldman, E. and Arquilla, J., ed. (2014). Cyber Analogies. Monterey: Progressive Management.
Mazanek, B. (2015). Why International Order is not Inevitable. Strategic Studies Quarterly, 9 (2), pp. 78-98. [online] Available at: http://www.airuniversity.af.mil/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-09_Issue-2/mazanec.pdf [Accessed on 28.01.2018].
 U.S. Department of Defense (2012). Remarks by Secretary Panetta on Cybersecurity to the Business Executives for National Security, New York City, [online] Available at: http://archive.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5136 [Accessed on 22.01.2018].
 McAfee (2012). Cyber Defense Report. [online] Available at: https://www.mcafee.com/uk/about/news/2012/q1/20120130-02.aspx [Accessed on 22.01.2018].
 Hawser, A. (2017). NATO to Use Cyber Effects in Defensive Operations. Defense Procurement International, [online] Available at: https://www.defenceprocurementinternational.com/features/air/nato-and-cyber-weapons [Accessed on 22.01.2018].
 NATO (2017). NATO Defense Ministers agree to adopt command structure, boost Afghanistan troops levels. [online] Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/news_148722.htm?selectedLocale=en [Accessed on 22.01.2018].
 Gurung, Sh. (2018). Army stepping up cyber security. The Economic Times, [online] Available at: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/army-stepping-up-cyber-security/articleshow/62482582.cms [Accessed on 23.01.2018].
 Here it means both offensive and defensive capabilities (Author’s note).
 The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (edited in 2014). Moscow: p. 4. [online] Available at: http://www.mid.ru/documents/10180/822714/41d527556bec8deb3530.pdf/d899528d-4f07-4145-b565-1f9ac290906c [Accessed on 23.01.2018].
Technological change and new challenges in war
The notion of war has been changing for a long time due to technological advances. This subsequently has caused new arms races. Since the first military revolution in infantry and artillery during the Hundred Years’ War, many things have been indeed reshaped. New technologies consistently redefined the way wars are conducted and altered the notion of risk (both for combatants and civilians).
For a long time land and sea were the main domains for a war. As the technology further developed and a flight capability was introduced, air has become a new domain. That posed new risks and challenges that one could not overlook. To keep balancing on the battlefield one needed to adjust accordingly and develop its own air capability. Having only land troops and naval ships were suddenly not enough to prevail in these new circumstances. The military planning and strategy changed with it, shifting from the trench warfare during the World War I to a blitzkrieg and air raids during the World War II.
In the middle of 20th century nuclear weapons were invented which greatly impacted the warfare and the balance of international relations. The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki showed more than just a massive destructive power that could obliterate millions in a blink of the eye. Years later demonstrated a real impact of a nuclear bomb and its long-lasting consequences as well as how poorly prepared were the infrastructures for a nuclear attack.
The advent of internet and its rapid development brought another military revolution, introducing computer-assisted battlefield and precision-guided munitions (PGM). More sophisticated weapons like missiles increased the distance between enemies, hence changing the risks involved and recalculating political strategy and tactics. Increased dependency on information technology resulted in new threats and opened new vulnerabilities of national security (Ohlin, Govern and Finkelstein, 2015, x-xiii).
Meanwhile, the amount of cyber threats and vulnerabilities are rapidly increasing. At the moment there are several tendencies for cyberattacks. First, it takes less time to launch a cyberattack as its speed of transmission is very high. Second, such attacks are becoming more frequent and have more serious impact on systems. Third, there are now different types of actors, capable of launching a cyberattack.
Estonia was the first to experience the effects of growing technological dependency in the history. In 2007 its government infrastructure, financial sector and media were targeted and attacked entirely in cyberspace. The country proved to be highly vulnerable and unable to give a timely response, yet after these attacks Estonia started a public discussion on the issues of cyber defense in security and pushed other countries to take these issues into consideration. In a way, it was a stimulus to raise awareness on increased vulnerabilities and cyber threats (See also Aaviksoo, 2010).
This new space has clearly its threats as any other physical domain. As online interconnectivity increases, cyber threats are increasing with them. All digital technologies that receive, transmit, and manage digital data can be potentially interfered through a cyberattack (Lewis and Unal, 2017). Cyber security expert Rod Beckstrom, who is a former Chief Executive Officer of ICANN, said: “Everything networked can be hacked. Everything is being networked, so everything is vulnerable”.
That was further proven by the Black Hat Briefings, the biggest computer security conferences in the world. These vulnerabilities can be easily exploited. Cyberattacks vary from data theft and financial fraud to data manipulation and manipulation of machine instructions. Furthermore, they can interfere with enemy sensors, communications, command-control systems, and weapon systems. In this sense, defending electronic infrastructure grows consistently as our dependence on information system grows.
Similarly to the development of nuclear weapons back to the 20th century, it is well-known that many countries are currently developing cyber capabilities and boosting research and investment in this area. This means that the arms race in cyberspace has already started. In 2007 there were 120 countries, already developed ways to use the internet to target different sectors (Ohlin, Govern, and Finkelstein, 2015, xii).
As much as the debate in regards to offensive cyber capacities is increasing its pace, two distinct patters are emerged in the way it is discussed. Some say that cyber can lower the threshold in war; others worry about its use in taking down critical infrastructures.
In the first optimistic case, military and states regard these capabilities capable of occupying a new niche in diplomatic tools. In 2014 Eric Rosenbach, an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security at that time, has indeed referred cyber operations as helpful in reaching national goals. Specifically, he mentioned “the space between” diplomacy, economic sanctions and military action, meaning using cyber space to accomplish national interest. Cyberattacks can be used as an addition to military strikes or can become an alternative to direct kinetic confrontation, complimenting other tools used in politics. Thus, they can further lower the threshold of the use of force in a war.
In other case, however, it can possess as much destructive power as nuclear weapons, for example if it is targeted on power grids or critical infrastructures. Increased connectivity from consumer goods to critical infrastructure control systems poses great risks and vulnerabilities across the world (Weber, 2010). These vulnerabilities can be used as leverage or they can be used exploited instead of launching a missile, following a similar ultimate goal of taking down an adversary.
Traditionally, national and international security has been seen through a physical lens. Normally there is always a state that secures its land borders, sea boundaries, and protects airspace. In contrast, there is no equivalent to city police or a state army that protects its citizens in cyberspace. As professor of National Security Affairs Reveron summarizes, unlike other domains, the government does not have a natural role in cyberspace to promote security. In its turn cyber challenges the traditional framework of security.
Today people willingly share, transmit or store all sort of data through the internet. It is not surprising that a new strategy evolves by planting software into an electronic device to manipulate this data. For instance, by manipulating e-mails of nuclear power plant employees it is possible to acquire sensitive information and use it as a leverage tool. This shift in the notion of warfare merged military and corporate espionage functions. Militarization of cyberspace subsequently blurred legal and moral definitions of privacy rights. In the 21st century any individual may be targeted in the virtual world, depending on the information niche s/he is occupying. In result, the line between military and civil sectors is fading away.
All in all, cyber capabilities have indeed brought a new technological change and now re-shifting security, definitions and rules of war. International law, at the same time, has been slow in adjusting to a new evolving order and establishing an appropriate legal regime for cyberattacks. Moreover, this technological advance has coined a new term for the notion of war – a cyberwar. Ohlin, Govern, and Finkelstein suggest that this change brings not only new weapons to be employed, but transforms the entire notion of war (2015, xiii).
Lewis, P. and Unal, B. (2017). Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons System. In: Borrie, J., Caughley, T., and Wan, W., (Eds.), Understanding Nuclear Weapons Risks, 1st ed. Geneva: UNIDIR, pp. 61-72.
Ohlin, J.D., Govern, K. and Finkelstein, C., eds. (2015). Cyberwar Law and Ethics for Virtual Conlicts. New York: Oxford University Press.
Sulek, D. and Moran, N. (2009).What Analogies Can Tell Us About the Future of Cybersecurity. Cryptology and Information Security Series, 3, pp. 118-131.
Weber, R. (2010). Internet of Things: New Security and Privacy Challenges. Computer Law & Security Review, 26 (1), pp. 23-30.
 Flanagan, B. (2016). Hacked Asteroids Destroying Earth and Other Cybergeddon Scenarios. Knowledge Hub, [online] Available at: https://www.worldgovernmentsummit.org/knowledge-hub/hacked-asteroids-destroying-earth-and-other-cybergeddon-scenarios [Accessed 20.12.2017].
 Cyber Leaders: A Discussion with the Honorable Eric Rosenbach. (2014). Centre for Strategic & International Studies,
Available at: https://www.csis.org/events/cyber-leaders-discussion-honorable-eric-rosenbach [Accessed on 20.12.2017].
 Reveron, D. (2017). How Cyberspace is Transforming International Security. Faculty insight at Harvard Extension School, [online] Available at: https://www.extension.harvard.edu/inside-extension/how-cyberspace-transforming-international-security [Accessed 28/12/2017].
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